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A Novel Account of Scientific Anomaly:
Help for the Dispute over Low-Dose
Biochemical Effects
Kevin C. EUiotttt
The biological effects of low doses of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals are currently
a matter of significant scientific controversy. This paper argues that philosophers of
science can contribute to alleviating this controversy by examining it with the aid of
a novel account of scientific anomaly. Specifically, analysis of contemporary research
on chemical hormesis (i.e.. alleged beneficial biological effects produced by low doses
of substances that are harmful at higher doses) suggests that scientists may initially
describe anomalous phenomena in terms of multiple distinct '"characterizations," each
of which is compatible with current empirical evidence. By focusing attention on this
feature of scientific anomalies, philosophers of science can alleviate the controversy
over low-dose chemical effects in at least two ways: (I) they can pinpoint the significant
ways in which particular characterizations frame the controversy, and (2) they can
identify the methodological value judgments at stake in researchers' choice of
characterizations.

1. Introduction. Scientific anomalies are of significant theoretical interest
in the philosophy of science, and they also play an important practical
role in some biological controversies. In the philosophy of science, anomalies are important for at least two related reasons. First, most of the
classic twentieth-century works on scientific theory change, including
those of Karl Popper (1959), Thomas Kuhn (1970), Imre Lakatos (1970),
and Larry Laudan (1977), suggested that anomalies play a crucial "catalytic" role in the processes by which scientists develop new theories and
alter previous ones. Second, many recent studies argue that the process
of scientific discovery often involves a gradual modification and elaboration of existing theories or models in response to scientific problems,
tTo contact the author write to: Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208; email: ke@sc.edu,
JI would like to thank Kristin Shrader-Frechette for very helpful input on earlier
versions of this paper.
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many of which involve anomalies (Wimsatt 1987;Darden 1991; SchafTner
1993; Nickles 1997; Elliott 2004a). Thus, both classic discussions of theory
change and contemporary studies of scientific discovery affirm that anomalies are central to scientific progress.
Some of the literature on science policy suggests that anomalies also
have the potential to play an important role in many scientific controversies, especially those with practical ramifications. For example, when
a body of scientific evidence supports a particular policy that runs counter
to a political actor's own agenda, he or she may search for and emphasize
anomalous scientific data as a way of resisting the evidence for the policy
(Herrick and Sarewitz 2000; Sarewitz 2000). Furthermore, whereas anomalies in highly theoretical areas of science might "simmer" relatively unnoticed for an extended period of time, thus enabling researchers to develop increased understanding of them (Kuhn 1970). the policy process
is likely to bring anomalies to the political front burner immediately, when
scientists still know very little about their characteristics (Collins and
Evans 2002).
Section 2 of this paper examines eontemporary controversies concerning
the low-dose biological effects of toxic chemicals and argues that anomalies do indeed play a central role in these disputes. On the basis of this
case study. Section 3 suggests a novel philosophical account of scientific
anomaly that emphasizes the potential for anomalies to display multiple
"characterizations." Section 4 of the paper argues that this account suggests at least two ways in which philosophers of science can help to resolve
the biological controversy over low-dose chemical effects.
2. The Biological Controversy over Low-Dose Chemical Effects. The lowdose biological etTects of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals are currently
a matter of hot policy debate. On one hand, researchers such as Theo
Colborn claim that extremely low doses of many chemicals may mimic
hormones such as estrogen and be responsible for dramatic declines in
animal populations. Some claim that these "endocrine-disrupting" chemicals may also be related to human reproductive cancers, immune disorders, and declining male sperm counts (Colborn. Dumanoski, and Myers 1996). Nicholas Ashford adds that approximately 5% of the U.S.
population may suffer from extreme sensitivity to toxic chemicals. This
phenomenon, which is frequently called "multiple chemical sensitivity"
(MCS). may be linked to "Gulf War syndrome." "sick-building syndrome," and other environmental sensitivities (Ashford and Miller 1998).
On the other hand, the infiuential toxicologist Edward Calabrese suggests
that low doses of many toxins may actually have beneficial effects. He
claims that these beneficial effects, which he calls "chemical hormesis,"
are widely generalizable across different species, biological endpoints., and
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toxins, atid he notes that this phenomenon "is counter to the cancer risk
assessment practices by U.S. regulatory agencies . . . which assume that
cancer risk is linear in the low-dose area" (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998,
VIII-1; see also Calabrese and Baldwin 2003).
Beneficial effects produced by low doses of toxic chemicals are plausibly
an example of a scientific anomaly. In order to predict the effects of toxins
and carcinogens, toxicologists currently use models that predict either
harmful effects at all dose levels or thresholds below which chemicals have
no biological effect (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003). Although researchers
and policy makers recognize that these models provide only rough approximations of actual chemical effects, the models are part of a toxicological framework in which toxic chemicals are expected to produce
harmful effects (if they produce effects at all) at low doses. Thus, the
occurrence of chemical hormesis is unexpected, or anomalous, relative to
current toxicological science. Many of the phenomena associated with
endocrine disruption and MCS are also anomalous (see Elliott 2004b).
The rest of this paper focuses on hormesis as one particular example of
anomaly in the controversy over low-dose chemical effects, but many
features of the hormesis case also apply to the phenomena of MCS and
endocrine disruption.
The effects of alcohol on human mortality provide a good illustration
of the characteristics of the hormesis phenomenon (although not all researchers would consider the alcohol case as a genuine instance of hormesis). At high doses, alchohol increases human mortality, but at lower
doses it can actually decrease the mortality rate below the level of controls
(Gordon and Doyle 1987). The result is a U-shaped dose-response curve
that reflects the production of opposite effects at low doses versus at high
doses (see Figure 1), which is characteristic of hormetic responses to toxic
chemicals. These sorts of hormetic effects can allegedly occur on endpoints
such as fertility, cancer incidence, growth, body weight, or enzyme activity,
in addition to mortality.
A particularly striking feature of the hormesis anomaly is that current
researchers appear to be describing or "characterizing" it in multiple,
different ways. Each of these characterizations involves an "empirical
component" and a "theoretical component" that stand in a problematic
relation to one another, but the components vary from one characterization to another. For example, when some researchers describe the hormesis anomaly, they focus on one or more sets of experimental data that
are unexpected (e.g., Vichi and Tritton 1989; Davis and Svendsgaard
1990). If one were to make these researchers' characterizations of the
anomaly as explicit as possible, they would seem to involve an inconsistency relation between statements that describe a set of data from one or
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Figure 1. Examples of the general form of hormetic dose-response relationships. The
bottom curve could represent the relationship between alcohol intake and human mortality, whereas the top curve couid represent a hormetie relationship between dose of
a growth inhibitor and platit growth.
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more experiments on one hand and statements that describe researchers'
expectations for those data on the other hand.
Other researchers appear to conceptualize the anomalous research data
as evidence for the occurrence of one or more particular sorts of phenomena.' I have argued, however, that current researchers have been
working with multiple different concepts for the hormesis phenomenon
(Elliott 2000b). Two broadly "operational" concepts for the phenomenon
include (I) "U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis" (henceforth "Ushaped hormesis") and (2) "beneficial hormesis."^ According to the first
concept (U-shaped hormesis), the phenomenon consists of "any nonspurious biological effect of a chemical that produces opposite effects at
higher doses" (Elliott 2000b, 354). The name for this concept is based on
the fact that a chemical that displays this sort of hormetic effect produces
either an upright or upside-down U-shaped dose-response curve (see Figure 1). Using this concept, some researchers appear to characterize the
hormesis anomaly as an inconsistency relation between descriptions of the
occurrence of U-shaped hormesis on one hand and descriptions of doseresponse models that do not incorporate U-shaped responses on the other
hand (see Calabrese and Baldwin 1998; Davis and Svendsgaard 1990). It
is notable, however, that even researchers who agree on employing Ushaped hormesis as the empirical component of their characterizations
may still vary their theoretical components. For example, Calabrese and
Baldwin (1998) frequently characterize the hormesis anomaly as a failure
of physiological theories to explain the occurrence of U-shaped hormesis.
Thus, the theoretical component of the anomaly could be not only a set
of models but also one or more physiological theories.
As I argued previously, however, researchers use other concepts, in
addition to U-shaped hormesis, for describing the hormesis phenomenon
(Elliott 2000b). For example, many scientists employ the concept of beneficial hormesis, which I defined as a beneficial effect produced by a chemical that produces harmful effects at higher doses (see, e.g., Gerber, Wil-

1. The term 'phenomenon' is used here to refer to a generalizable event that can be
predicted by a theory and for which the data in particular experiments provide evidence
(see Bogen and Woodward 1988; Woodward 2000).
2. For the purposes of this paper, an operational concept can be defined as one that
is defined in terms of its criteria of application, which in the case of hormesis involves
the measurement of some biological endpoint. A mechanistic concept involves the
isolation of a system in which hormetic phenomena are produced by the interaction
of parts according to causal laws (see, e.g., Bridgman 1927; Machamer, Darden, and
Craver 2000).
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Hams, and Gray 1999).' Other researchers appear to define the hormesis
phenomenon not merely in terms of particular operational effects but
rather in terms of the mechanisms by which a chemical produces those
effects. For example, Stebbing (1998) employs the concept of "overcompensation hormesis," which consists of opposite effects produced by "a
biological response in which processes are stimulated to above-normal
levels in an attempt to restore organismal homeostasis after it is altered
by a toxic chemical" (Elliott 2000b, 356)." Davis and Svendsgaard (1990)
and other scientists have also hinted at the concept of "multiple-effects
hormesis," which I defined as "a low-dose effect, opposite to that which
occurs at higher doses, that is caused by multiple biological effects of a
chemical influencing the same endpoint in different ways at different dose
levels" (Elliott 2000b, 360). Researchers who employ these different concepts for the hormesis anomaly appear to be characterizing it in subtly
different ways.
There even appear to be some characterizations of hormesis according
to which the theoretical component of the anomaly is not merely a model
or theory but an overarching/7ara£//^m. Especially in the early twentieth
century, some researchers suggested that hormesis might be the same sort
of phenomenon as homeopathy, even though they were not sure precisely
how to characterize homeopathy itself (Calabrese and Baldwin 2000).
Homeopathy is a debated medical practice in which people are treated
for an illness by receiving extremely small quantities of substances that
produce the same symptoms as the illness. Some homeopathic physicians
make the surprising claim that their remedies are helpful even when they
are diluted to the point that not even one molecule of the homeopathic
substance is left in solution. Thus, at least some forms of homeopathic
medicine run counter to paradigmatic assumptions of modern chemistry
and physics, which hold that solutions do not retain the properties of
substances that are no longer present in them. According to this characterization of the hormesis anomaly, it would consist of an inconsistency
relation between descriptions of the phenomenon of hormesis (i.e., homeopathy) and descriptions of the current paradigms of chemistry, physics,
and toxicology, which run counter to homeopathic phenomena.
3. The concept of beneficial hormesis is very similar to the concept of U-shaped hormesis. but the beneficial hormesis concept requires that the !ow-dose effect of a hormetic
toxin must not merely be the opposite of what is produced at higher doses but must
also be a hem-ficial effect.
4. Even though overcompensation hormesis does not involve one particular mechanism, it abstractly identifies a family of related mechanisms, so one might call it a
mechanism "sketch" or "schema" (see Machamer et al. 20(X)).
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3. A Novel Account of Anomaly. This section argues that the hormesis
case study suggests a novel account that emphasizes the multipHcity of
characterizations with which researchers may describe an anomaly. The
case illustrates two particularly important ways in which the characterizations of an anomaly may differ from one another. First, the "general
type" of the empirical or theoretical components may vary. This paper
defines the general types of anomaly components as broad categories that
describe the sorts of entities that can serve as empirical or theoretical
components. Sels of data and phenomena are two general types of empirical anomaly components in the hormesis case, whereas researchers'
expectations, models, theories, mechanism schemata, and paradigms are
general types of theoretical anomaly components." The characterizations
of an anomaly may also vary in a second way if their components differ
in what this paper will call their "specific type." The specific type is a
particular instantiation of the general type; it can serve as the empirical
or theoretical component in an actual characterization of an anomaly.
For example, two characterizations of hormesis may both have the same
general type of empirical component (namely, a phenomenon), but the
specific type of empirical component may be the phenomenon of U-shaped
hormesis in one characterization and the phenomenon of beneficial hormesis in the other.
Previous accounts of anomaly do not appear to have placed major
emphasis on either of these ways in which the characterizations of an
anomaly can vary. First, they each focused attention on one or two particular general types of empirical and theoretical components (e.g., phenomena, theories, paradigms, or research programs) that anomalies sometimes display (see Popper 1959; Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977;
Darden 1991). Second, they did not emphasize the ways in which the
specific type of an anomaly's components could vary from one characterization to another; instead, they tended to describe an anomaly in terms
of a specific phenomenon that confiicted with a particular theory or paradigm. More than other thinkers, Kuhn (1970) did draw some attention
to the potential for an anomaly to be conceptualized differently as researchers converted from one paradigm to another, but his discussion of
this feature of anomaly was not systematic/
5. I thank Lindley Darden for suggesting that mechanism schemata may often serve
as the theoretical component of anomalies in the biological sciences.
6. Although Darden has not previously emphasized how the general and spKcific types
of an anomaly's components vary from one characterization to another, the process
of developing multiple characterizations for an anomaly could plausibly be associated
with her first two strategies or stages for anomaly resoiution (i.e.. confirming that an
anomaly exists and localizing the problem) (Darden 1991). I have previously argued
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As a first step toward developing a novel account that emphasizes how
anomalies may display multiple characterizations, this paper offers the
following description of anomaly. It is called "account P" because it emphasizes the plurality of ways in which researchers may describe and
conceptualize an anomaly.
Account P. A scientific anomaly is described by a "characterization,""
which consists of an empirical component, a theoretical component,
and a problematic relation between them. An anomaly may admit
of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific
types of their components and the relation between them:^
(i) individual researchers may employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time,
(ii) different researchers may employ different characterizations at
roughly the same time, and
(iii) researchers may change their characterizations over time.
In the hormesis case, for example, Calabrese and Baldwin's report on
their initial literature study constitutes an example of how individual
researchers can pursue more than one characterization at a time, because
they employed some characterizations involving the phenomenon of Ushaped hormesis and others using that of overcompensation hormesis
(Calabrese and Baldwin 1998). Meanwhile, other researchers have emphasized different characterizations that do not conceptualize hormesis
as a particular phenomenon but rather describe it in terms of experimental
data that conflict with researchers' expectations for their experiments (e.g.,
Jonas 2001). Finally, Calabrese and Baldwin continue to alter their characterizations. After their initial literature study, they began to focus on
"mechanistic" characterizations of hormesis as an overcompensation phenomenon {Calabrese 1999), but more recently they reverted to "operational" characterizations of the anomaly (Calabrese and Baldwin 2002).
In addition to the support that account P receives from the hormesis
case (and the cases of MCS and endocrine disruption, as described in
Elliott [2004b]), recent theoretical work in the philosophy of science also
indicates the value of this description of anomaly. In particular, a number
of thinkers have emphasized that experimental data often must be interthat these early stages need to be examined further and that they may play an important
role in the process of scientific discovery (Elliott 2004a).
7. Note that even though this paper does not explore variations in the problematic
relation that holds between the components of different anomaly characterizations,
account P suggests that the anomalous relation could also vary (including, e.g.. relations
of inconsistency, inexplicability, incompatibility, lack of conformation, and lack of
homomorphism or isomorphism).
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preted extensively before they can be brought to bear in the justification
or testing oftheories (see Hacking 1988; Mayo 1996). For example, Bogen
and Woodward (1988) argue that low-level experimental results are not
directly explained by scientific theories; rather, researchers use experimental data to infer the occurrence of more generalizable phenomena. In
addition, David Gooding (1990) has emphasized that, as scientists develop
concepts for describing novel phenomena, they may start with intermediate descriptions of their perceptual experiences that he calls "construals." He suggests that researchers conceptualize their results only after
a period of what might be called "exploratory experimentation" (Steinle
1997). These claims support the notion in account P that the general or
specific type of an anomaly's components may vary as researchers consider
how to interpret their results.
4. How Account P Can Alleviate Controversy. By providing a more detailed analysis of the early stages in which scientists analyze anomalous
findings, account P may suggest new insights concerning a variety of
philosophical topics, including scientific discovery and the role of values
in scientific practice (Elliott 2004b). This paper argues, in particular, that
account P may help to alleviate biological controversies that involve
anomalous findings. By highlighting the variety of characterizations that
policy-relevant anomalies may display, this description of anomaly can
contribute at least two sorts of insights. First, account P encourages philosophers of science to look for ways in which the characterizations of
an anomaly play an important role in framing a controversy. Second, the
account highlights the importance of identifying the methodological value
judgments at stake in the choice of characterizations for anomalies that
are implicated in biological controversies. By highlighting the framing
effects and methodological value judgments associated with particular
characterizations, philosophers of science can warn researchers and policy
makers about anomaly conceptualizations that are particularly questionable or that have the potential to influence the ongoing controversy in
significant ways.
4.1. Framing the Controversy. A number of different characterizations
of hormesis have the potential to play an important role in framing the
controversy concerning low-dose toxic chemical effects. First, characterizing the hormesis anomaly as a homeopathic phenomenon (that potentially conflicts with overarching paradigms of chemistry and physics) appears to decrease its legitimacy and to discourage research concerning it.
For example, Calabrese suggests that the tendency for researchers to associate hormesis with homeopathy was a crucial factor contributing to
the lack of attention that hormesis received from roughly the 1930s to
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the 1980s (see Calabrese and Baldwin 2000). In contrast, the concepts of
"overcompensation" or "multiple-effects" hormesis appear to increase its
scientific legitimacy considerably. Each of these concepts characterizes
hormesis in terms of specific, plausible mechanistic phenomena (either
processes of overcompensation to toxins or multiple effects of a chemical
on different biological endpoints). Thus, they make it appear more likely
that hormesis is a legitimate phenomenon that deserves further research.
Nevertheless, It is not clear that these concepts, by themselves, strongly
support the significance of hormesis for public policy. For example, the
concept of overcompensation hormesis suggests that toxic chemicals produce beneficial low-dose effects for only a short time (during which the
overcompensation occurs), after which they could revert to neutral or
harmful effects. The eoncept of multiple-effects hormesis indicates that
hormetic effects may not be very generalizable from one chemical or
endpoint to another, because those effects depend on the unique potential
for particular chemicals to produce multiple effects on particular biological systems.
In contrast with other concepts of hormesis, that of beneficial hormesis
does appear to draw attention to the potential policy significance of the
phenomenon. It suggests that toxic chemicals may produce beneficial effects for organisms when administered at sufficiently low doses (which
might seem to indicate that some regulations of toxic chemicals need to
be relaxed). Nevertheless, this concept also has the potential to create
confusion. It suggests that the new view about toxic chemicals is that they
may be beneficial at low doses, in contrast to the old view (which is that
they were harmful at low doses). But this dichotomy between old and
new views may gloss over the fact that a toxic chemical can produce a
beneficial effect on one endpoint over the short term while still having
harmful effects on the organism as a whole over the long term. Thus, less
normative concepts, such as U-shaped hormesis, might be preferable to
the concept of beneficial hormesis, because they might decrease the potential for people to assume that hormetic etTects are beneficial for entire
organisms over extended periods of time.
This possibility for the concept of beneficial hormesis to frame debates
about hormesis in a manner that misleads the public is made even more
serious because of the potential for researchers to conflate different concepts of the anomaly. For example, I have argued previously that Calabrese and Baldwin (1998) initially defended the generalizability of hormesis by providing evidence for the occurrence of U-shaped hormesis
(Elliott 2000a). In the same publication (as well as in many other
publications by them and other authors), however, they shifted to the
concept of beneficial hormesis and suggested that their results encouraged
reevaluation of government risk-assessment policy based on the likely
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occurrence of beneficial effects produced by low doses of toxic chemicals.
They did not provide independent evidence, though, that opposite effects
on individual endpoints over the short term are genuinely beneficial for
the organism as a whole over the long term. Thus, Calabrese and Baldwin's conflation of different concepts may increase the potential for policy
makers and members of the public to be confused about the likelihood
that toxic chemicals are producing genuinely beneficial effects at low doses.
4.2. Methodological Value Judgments. Account P can also contribute
to alleviating contemporary biological controversies over low-dose chemical effects by highlighting the methodological value judgments that are
involved in choosing some characterizations of an anomaly rather than
others. In the case of hormesis, two value judgments appear to be particularly important. The first has already been introduced by the preceding
discussion of the beneficial hormesis concept and its framing effects. Researchers have to decide whether the evidence that U-shaped hormesis
occurs provides adequate reason to think that beneficial hormesis also
occurs. Gerber et al. acknowledge that apparent beneficial effects on one
endpoint "might have the effect of altering an optimum resource allocation
among such functions as growth, maintenance, and reproduction. . . . A
higher level of performance in any one of these [as a result of a hormetic
effect] might be achieved at the expense of the other two [thus resulting
in negative effects for the organism as a whole]" (1999, 275). Nevertheless,
they make the methodological value judgment that Calabrese and Baldwin
have identified enough apparent instances of U-shaped hormesis on different endpoints to conclude that beneficial hormesis does occur (278).
Other researchers, such as University of Missouri biologist Fred vom Saal,
are very skeptical o^ the notion that U-shaped dose-response curves on
particular endpoints are likely to result in benefical effects for an organism
as a whole (see Kaiser 2003).
A second methodological judgment involves determining whether the
literature-study approach employed by Calabrese and Baldwin (1998) provides sufficient evidence to conclude that the hormesis anomaly constitutes
a widely generalizable phenomenon rather than an occasional set of anomalous data. On one hand, a number of researchers appear to think that
Calabrese and Baldwin have uncovered very convincing evidence for a
general phenomenon (e.g., Gerber et al. 1999). On the other hand, Jonas
(2001) represents the views of another group of scientists when he claims
that "Less than \% of over 20,000 studies reviewed [by Calabrese and
Baldwin] came close to true hypothesis testing of hormesis in experimental
settings. . . . The criteria for rigorous 'proof of hormesis will be different
than those the authors [i.e., Calabrese and Baldwin] have used simply to
'identify' hormesis [sic] may exist. In the former one would want to assure
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proper dose verification, randomization of samples, blinding of outcome
measures, proper statistical analysis, and full reporting of all data" (626627; see also Mayo and Spanos 2006J.
5. Conclusion. This paper argued that attention to a novel account of
scientific anomaly can contribute to the alleviation of biological controversies concerning the low-dose effects of toxic chemicals. It developed a
new description of anomaly, called account P, that emphasizes how researchers may employ multiple characterizations for a single anomaly.
These characterizations involve empirical and theoretical anomaly components that vary in their "general" and "specific" types. The paper then
suggested how, in the case of the hormesis anomaly, attention to this
account can alleviate biological controversy. Account P encourages philosophers of science to identify the framing effects of particular characterizations and the methodological value judgments involved in employing
some characterizations over others. By doing so, they can highlight anomaly conceptualizations that are likely to exacerbate or mitigate controversy.
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